What 161 owners told NHTSA about the 2024 Tesla Cybertruck (all Variants)

Approximately 10 minutes after my vehicle was serviced at a Tesla Service Center for a Full Self-Driving (FSD) concern, I entered the highway and engaged FSD. The service center had stated the system was operating correctly. While traveling approximately 75 mph through a highway curve, FSD suddenly changed to an "Unavailable" state. According to Tesla's own accident data, I did not disengage FSD. There was no audible warning, no effective visual warning, no takeover request, no controlled deceleration, and no safe handoff to the driver before the vehicle stopped controlling itself. Within about one second of FSD becoming unavailable, the vehicle left its intended path and struck a concrete highway divider. If the divider had not been present, the vehicle likely would have crossed into oncoming highway traffic, creating the risk of a catastrophic head-on collision with other vehicles, including a semi-truck. Tesla's accident report confirms I did not disengage FSD and shows no warning or takeover request before impact. I possess documentation supporting that FSD became unavailable without a safe transition to the driver. This failure occurred immediately after Tesla serviced the vehicle and represented that the FSD system was functioning properly. Despite the accident data, Tesla Customer Support and the Service Center have refused to acknowledge or investigate what appears to be a failure of the FSD system's fail-safe behavior. The failed component appears to be the FSD/Autopilot system and its driver handoff logic. The vehicle and electronic records are available for inspection. An automated driving system should not terminate operation at highway speed without providing adequate warning, a safe transfer of control, or controlled deceleration. I believe this presents a serious safety defect that could result in fatal crashes. The collision caused approximately $15,500 in vehicle damage.

NHTSA ODI 11747861

I was driving my Tesla Cybertruck on the highway when I experienced unexpected steering movements from side to side. I attempted to maintain control of the vehicle and slow down. The vehicle ultimately left its intended path and collided with the median. I do not know the cause of the incident. At the time of the accident, I believe a Tesla driver-assistance feature may have been engaged, but I am requesting that Tesla review the vehicle data and logs to determine exactly what systems were active and whether any vehicle malfunction contributed to the event. The accident resulted in significant vehicle damage. I am submitting this report because I am concerned that a potential steering, vehicle control, or driver-assistance system issue may have contributed to the incident and I believe the event should be investigated.

NHTSA ODI 11743708

On 05/30/2026 at approximately 15H24, my Tesla Cybertruck was parked and stopped at approx. [XXX] of Target). No one was seated in the driver seat. A passenger entered the vehicle and sat in the front passenger seat to play music. Shortly after the passenger sat down, the vehicle suddenly and unexpectedly moved forward on its own and rear-ended the vehicle parked directly in front of it and causing damages. This occurred while the vehicle was supposed to be parked/stationary and while there was no driver in the driver seat. We do not understand what triggered the vehicle to move forward. This appears to be a serious safety issue because a parked, unattended vehicle should not move forward without driver input. The incident created a collision risk to nearby vehicles, pedestrians, and anyone standing in front of or around the vehicle. I am requesting that NHTSA review this as a potential unintended movement / unintended acceleration / park-to-drive activation / rollaway safety defect. Tesla should be required to investigate the vehicle logs and determine whether the movement was caused by a software issue, gear selection issue, Autopark/FSD/Summon/mobile app activation, brake hold/parking brake failure, sensor/occupancy issue, accelerator pedal issue, or any other defect. Video and photos in the link: [XXX] There was property damage to the vehicle parked in front. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ODI 11741313

The failed components include the Tesla Vision system (cameras), sensors, Active Safety Control Module (AEB), and Gear Selection UI. Symptoms first appeared on April 30, 2026, including black screens and "Autopilot Unavailable" alerts. Internal vehicle logs from Apr 30 to May 02 confirm persistent "SNA" (Signal Not Available) and "UNAVAILABLE" states for these critical safety modules well before the collision. On the day of the accident (May 02), the logs recorded 25 instances of Gear UI signal loss, which completely disabled the rearview camera and proximity alerts while reversing. This total "blind" state put my safety at extreme risk as I had zero visibility of blind spots and received no audible warnings. The Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) was also recorded as "UNAVAILABLE," failing to prevent the collision. The problem is scientifically confirmed by the vehicle's internal diagnostic logs, which I have retrieved and am ready to provide for inspection. The accident has been reported to the local police and Progressive Insurance. I am currently coordinating with Tesla Service for a formal inspection of these software and hardware defects.

NHTSA ODI 11736349

I was driving my 2024 Tesla Cybertruck on the Freeway 57 southbound between 9:06 AM to 9:10 AM at about 60 mph when the vehicle suddenly steered sharply to the left without any input from me. It completed a full 360-degree spin, hit the concrete median, and then came to a stop. No other cars were involved. The truck is heavily damaged and not drivable. This appears to be a sudden mechanical or software failure. I have reported it to 911 and the police car moved the vehicle to a safe place. I have reported it to Tesla and requested a full diagnostic review of the vehicle logs.

NHTSA ODI 11730720

On December 23, 2025, at approximately 9:45 AM, I was operating my Tesla Cybertruck with Autopilot engaged under normal driving conditions. There was no inclement weather, the roadway was straight, and visibility was clear. While driving, the vehicle suddenly veered off the main roadway without warning and traveled off-road, ultimately colliding with a tree. The movement was abrupt and not consistent with normal lane departure. I immediately attempted to correct the direction of the vehicle; however, the vehicle did not respond appropriately to my steering input and felt unresponsive during the event. At no point did I intentionally steer off the roadway. The loss of control was unexpected given the road conditions and environment. This incident raises concerns about the reliability and safety of the Autopilot/driver assistance system and its ability to maintain lane control and allow driver override when needed.

NHTSA ODI 11725051

I have the Foundation Cyberbeast, the model which has an OEM light bar on windshield. While driving on 2-22-2026 at approximately 3:30 pm on the 5 freeway near Santa Ana, the appx 4 ft long light bar flew off and ricocheted violently on vehicle, while still attached by the power cord. This damaged many parts of my vehicle, specifically the glass roof, front windshield, and various body components which were shattered or scratched. I cut my hands. Your database says there are 0 open recalls and that is a lie by Tesla, because they sent me a notice months ago saying they are awaiting mechanical attachment methods. So they know they need to change the attachment method from epoxy to mechanical, but are falsely reporting to the government that they already did so.

NHTSA ODI 11719780

While operating on a public roadway with Tesla Full Self-Driving (Supervised) engaged, the vehicle unexpectedly departed its intended roadway trajectory. Upon recognizing unsafe vehicle behavior, I attempted to manually override and disengage the system using normal driver control inputs. Despite these attempts, the system did not disengage or yield control in a timely or effective manner. The vehicle continued on an unsafe path, left the roadway, and collided with a fence and a tree before meaningful driver control could be restored. This incident raises concerns regarding the reliability of driver override authority and the system’s ability to relinquish control during supervised operation.

NHTSA ODI 11709210

On December 23, 2025, my 2024 Tesla Cybertruck (Foundation Series) was operating with Full Self-Driving (FSD – Supervised) engaged. While FSD was active, the vehicle executed an unsafe driving trajectory. I attempted to intervene and regain control; however, the system did not disengage as expected and did not yield control appropriately to driver input. Despite driver intervention attempts, the vehicle continued along the unsafe trajectory, resulting in a loss of control and collision with roadside objects. There were no mechanical warnings or alerts prior to the incident. The issue appears related to system behavior, disengagement logic, and driver override response while FSD was active. The vehicle is currently preserved under a formal litigation hold. No inspection, teardown, or data access has occurred. Tesla has confirmed in writing that it does not modify, delete, or alter vehicle data it has received. I am submitting this complaint due to concerns regarding the safety behavior of Full Self-Driving (Supervised), including the system’s failure to disengage upon driver input and the human-machine interface governing control authority.

NHTSA ODI 11708875

I believe there was an issue with the ABS system that kept me from stopping the vehicle, as speed was increasing while going downhill with the brake pedal pushed hard. I was forced to make the choice to steer the vehicle into a mountainside to stop it before I ended up over the side of the mountain road. The vehicle then tipped over, coming to a stop.

NHTSA ODI 11707191

I am submitting this safety complaint as the vehicle owner of a Tesla that was involved in a collision on November 15, 2025. Although I am the policyholder and registered owner, I was not the driver at the time of the incident. My husband, [XXX] , was operating the vehicle, and Tesla Autopilot/FSD was engaged when the loss of control occurred. At the time of the incident, it was raining heavily, though visibility and road conditions were still within what Autopilot typically handles during normal operation. While driving under these conditions with Autopilot activated, the vehicle suddenly exhibited unexpected and erratic steering behavior, causing it to lose stability and veer out of control. The deviation happened rapidly and without sufficient warning or opportunity for my husband to intervene manually. The resulting collision appeared to be the result of an Autopilot system malfunction, not driver error. Key concerns include: Autopilot’s failure to maintain proper lane position Sudden abnormal steering input originating from the system Possible sensor, perception, or weather-related detection failure Lack of adequate warning or disengagement alert prior to the loss of control Tesla Insurance later determined the driver to be “principally at fault,” but this conclusion did not consider the possibility of Autopilot system failure under heavy rain conditions and does not reflect the sequence of events as experienced by the driver. As the vehicle owner, I am requesting that NHTSA review this incident as a potential safety defect involving Tesla’s Autopilot/FSD system. I am concerned that this malfunction—particularly under adverse weather—may also affect other Tesla owners and could indicate a broader systemic safety issue. I am willing to provide additional information, driver statements, documentation, or vehicle data upon request. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ODI 11702702

The contact’s father owns a 2024 Tesla Cybertruck. The contact’s father stated that while driving at an undisclosed speed, the Autopilot function became inoperable. The contact stated that while engaging the Autopilot function and attempting to make a turn in a residential area, the vehicle unexpectedly accelerated and collided with a tree. The air bags did not deploy during the incident. As a result of the crash, both the contact’s father and nephew sustained injuries and received medical attention at a local emergency room. The contact’s father sustained a rib injury and bruising, while the contact’s nephew suffered an ongoing back injury due to the incident. A police report was filed. The vehicle was towed and taken to a body shop. The dealer was contacted; however, the vehicle was not diagnosed or repaired. The manufacturer was made aware of the failure, and a case was opened. The approximate failure mileage was 1,500.

NHTSA ODI 11695239

On [XXX], [XXX] sat in the left rear-seat of a Cybertruck that was involved in a solo-vehicle collision. [XXX]'s impact injuries were minor. The truck caught fire. The right rear door remained mechanically openable, but its ordinary operation depended on low-voltage electronic buttons located inside the cabin and on the exterior pillar. Those buttons failed after the crash. A man tried to rescue the occupants, but he could not open the doors because the buttons failed and the truck lacks exterior handles. The "armor" glass made it difficult for the rescuer to break open the windows. The mechanical backup releases for the rear doors are concealed beneath the map pocket liner at the bottom of the doors — not feasible to find or use in the smoke, heat and chaos of a post-crash fire. This obscure release left the rear seat occupants with no practical means of egress. [XXX] died of smoke inhalation and burn injuries because he was trapped inside the Cybertruck. Another occupant and the driver also died. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ODI 11694986

On [XXX], [XXX] was a right rear passenger in a 2024 Cybertruck. The driver lost control and struck a tree with the driver side against a wall. The truck immediately caught fire. The operation of the doors was powered by a small battery pack which was no longer operational after the impact. The passenger side doors operate off of that battery. Without power, the passenger doors could not open, trapping the driver and passengers in the Cybertruck. The fire moved quickly to the passenger compartment and towards the trapped passengers. The design of the electric doors required passengers who are not familiar with the vehicle to find the location of a manual release hidden from view beneath a panel to remove that panel and pull the manual release mechanism. There are no instructions present to explain to a passenger how to access the manual release. The truck has no exterior door handles. The only means to open the door from the outside was a button located at the base of the B&C pillars. When the electric system failed, that door release button became useless. A rescuer arrived but had no way to open the passenger side doors from the outside. The truck’s “armor glass” windows made forcing entry extraordinarily difficult. The rescuer was able to break the passenger side window with repeated strikes and attempted to rescue [XXX] by extracting her through the front passenger window but was unsuccessful due to the heat from the fire. She was forced to retreat back to the rear seat. She survived the initial collision with no injuries and was fully conscious. She was unable to escape the Cybertruck and was killed due to smoke inhalation and thermal injuries. The failure of the vehicle’s design to provide emergency egress in the event of crash, power loss, and fire created a foreseeable and unreasonable risk of occupant entrapment and death in the event of a collision resulting in power loss. It is available for inspection by the NHTSA. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ODI 11695120

Cyber truck went hydroplane twice in the rain on low speed

NHTSA ODI 11681113

On May 15, 2025, at around 11:30 AM, my Tesla was involved in a collision while Full Self-Driving (FSD) was engaged. The incident occurred at the Tesla West Covina Dealership. The vehicle struck a barrier wall without any collision warning, suggesting both a failure of the sensors and FSD system. After the incident, Tesla staff directed me to their West Covina Service Center. A service advisor reviewed the dashcam footage with me and acknowledged the crash appeared to result from FSD malfunction. I was told Tesla will cover the repair. However, when I returned on May 26, 2025, I was informed that the dashcam footage was no longer available. I did not delete it and suspect it may have been removed by Tesla personnel. They also then claimed they will not cover any repairs. I have written to their legal department to formally request the video footage and any other data they have regarding the crash. Despite follow-up, Tesla has not responded or released any data. I am reporting this as a possible safety defect and mishandling of evidence. I request NHTSA investigate: The failure of Tesla’s FSD and collision avoidance system. The disappearance of crash footage after review by Tesla staff. Tesla’s lack of response to requests for data and documentation. Thank you for your attention.

NHTSA ODI 11677874

I was driving [XXX] going through Saint Paul and the truck sped up and became uncontrollable. I started braking as fast as I could and caused it to rear end into another vehicle. I’ve tried to contact Tesla about this, and they have not responded to me. I was told the engineering team would get back to me about the possible cause of the accident, but never heard back and they could not provide me any of the vehicle data or video which they told me in the service center. They would be able to find that when they diagnosed it, they did fix the vehicle and I ended up selling it due to not being too excited about driving ever again. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ODI 11668244

I am writing to report an incident that occurred on [XXX] [XXX] while my Cybertruck was operating in Full Self-Driving (FSD) mode. While driving on [XXX] Brooklyn NY with no other moving traffic present, my Cybertruck did not detect a vehicle that was parked improperly—sticking out too far into the lane. The FSD system failed to adjust its path accordingly and struck the side view mirror of my vehicle, causing significant damage to the mirror glass and housing. I understand that FSD is a driver-assist feature that requires supervision, and I was attentive during the drive. However, the clearance of side view mirrors from the driver’s perspective is extremely difficult to judge at street level, and I believe stationary obstacles of this nature should be reliably detected and avoided by the FSD system. This type of incident raises concerns about the performance of FSD in handling stationary objects, especially when the vehicle was otherwise properly supervised and operating in a straightforward environment. INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ODI 11665678

My child received second degree burns from playing the sky force reloaded game on the front display screen. See attached picture taking screen temperature measurements where it exceeds 125 degrees. This is when the truck is not in direct sunlight with the air conditioning running, it appears that the CPU dissipates heat through the screen directly which is not conducive to games that require a kid to keep his fingers on the screen. This is a safety risk that should be re-engineered. We noticed that it does not occur with all games, only with those that require a lot of processing power.

NHTSA ODI 11662155

On [XXX], at approximately around [XXX], an incident occurred involving the Auto Park feature of a Tesla vehicle in a quiet parking lot. The conditions were clear, with no adverse weather, obstacles, or surrounding vehicles. The Auto Park function was engaged, and the vehicle reversed and moved forward as expected. However, it failed to stop and collided with a yellow pole directly in front. The front camera feed was visible on the screen, but the vehicle did not detect or recognize the pole, and no collision alert was issued. The incident occurred too quickly to allow manual intervention via the brake pedal. The collision resulted in minor front bumper damage, with repair costs estimated at over $1,500. All incident details and vehicle data have been provided to Tesla for investigation. And they rejected to provide front plastic bumper replacement. [XXX] [XXX] INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ODI 11661656

While driving with Tesla's Full Self-Driving (FSD) system engaged, my vehicle struck two standard traffic cones in a clearly marked construction zone. The system failed to detect the cones or make any evasive action. I have video evidence of the incident. The situation was extremely dangerous. The cones could easily have been construction workers, pedestrians, or something more severe. I hesitated to intervene because it happened in a split second, and I was trusting the system to respond — which it completely failed to do. In that moment, I was also faced with a difficult choice: swerve and potentially cause a more serious accident, or trust that FSD would navigate correctly. It didn’t. The impact caused damage to my vehicle. When I brought it to Tesla, the technician dismissed my concern, laughed, and sarcastically told me, “There’s no way we’re paying for it.” He said it was my responsibility to avoid the cones — even while FSD was fully engaged. That kind of response is unacceptable, especially when Tesla markets this system as being capable of handling real-world driving environments like construction zones. This incident shows a significant failure in Tesla’s FSD recognition and decision-making systems. There were no warnings or alerts prior to the impact. The event raises major safety concerns, not only for the driver but for anyone on or near the road. I’m reporting this because I believe Tesla's current version of FSD has critical deficiencies that could lead to injury or worse. The system should never ignore basic road hazards like cones, and the company's dismissive response after the fact is alarming.

NHTSA ODI 11653398

The contact owns a 2024 Tesla Cybertruck. The contact stated that while driving at 70 MPH with the "Full Self-Driving" (FSD) active, the vehicle ahead of the contact's vehicle abruptly slowed down. The contact began to notice that the vehicle failed to detect the vehicle slowing down and the contact attempted to manually stop the vehicle. The contact crashed into the vehicle which resulted in a three-vehicle collision. The air bags failed to deploy upon impact; as a result, the contact hit her chest on the steering wheel. The contact was taken to the hospital via an ambulance and was treated for neck, back and chest pain. The two other vehicle occupants sustained both neck and back injuries but did not seek medical treatment. The whereabouts of the other drivers were unknown. A police report was filed(report unavailable). The vehicle was initially towed to an independent tow yard. The manufacturer was notified of the failure and later towed the vehicle to an authorized Tesla service center where it remained in their possession. The current condition of the vehicle remains unknown. The failure mileage was 5,149.

NHTSA ODI 11646503

WHILE DRIVING MY CYBERTRUCK ON FREEWAY USING TESLA'S FSD (FULL SELF DRIVING). VEHICLE SUDDENLY ACCELERATED, GOT OUT OF CONTROL AND CRASHED IN TO THE RAILING. LUCKLY I WAS ABLE TO CONTROL AFTER THR CRASH AND DROVE IT SAFE LOCATION. TRUCK IS SEVERELY DAMAGED AND TESLA IS NOT RESPONDING TO MY COMPLAINT. WE NEARLY GOT KILLED. PLEASE HELP.

NHTSA ODI 11635065

The contact owned a 2024 Tesla Cybertruck equipped with Pirelli Tires, Tire Line: Scorpion ATR, Tire Size: 285/65/R20, DOT Number: N/A. The contact stated that while driving at 70 MPH, he heard a loud bang, and the vehicle veered to the left. No warning light was illuminated. The contact attempted to steer right, but the vehicle failed to respond. The vehicle struck another vehicle in the left lane before both vehicles crashed into the median barrier wall. The contact's vehicle then spun into three right lanes and came to a complete stop on the right shoulder. The air bags were deployed. Upon inspection, the contact discovered that the rear driver's side rim was fractured. The contact and three passengers were taken to the hospital via ambulance. The contact sustained third-degree burns on his arms as a result of the air bag deployment. The second passenger had cuts on the head from the seat belt. The third passenger had cuts and bruises on the face from the seat belt. The fourth passenger sustained no injuries. A police report was filed and stated that the failure was caused by the rear driver's side tire blowout. The vehicle was towed to a tow yard and was deemed totaled by the insurance company. The manufacturer was not made aware of the failure, but the contact obtained the event data report and summary. The failure mileage was approximately 8,504.

NHTSA ODI 11632631

Large driver's touchscreen in the Cybertruck gets really, really hot. Brought it to Tesla for a service today (August 5th, 2024) and they said the screen is working as expected. They showed me another vehicle and it also had the 110 to 125 degree screen. This can burn skin if you're older and lacking nerves or a child (which Tesla encourages to use the screen with their video games). As this is a design defect and not a one-off part issue, I'd personally like to see this recalled. There are other people complaining about the same issue on this very new vehicle -- [XXX] Worth noting that this high temperature is produced in the lower center area of the screen. Tesla Service says it's due to the computer processor being located in that area with no way for the heat to dissipate (ie, a TV would have room behind it to dissipate the heat, but the Cybertruck has that area blocked). INFORMATION REDACTED PURSUANT TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552(B)(6)

NHTSA ODI 11606535